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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
 
IN RE: GOOGLE INC. GMAIL LITIGATION   
_______________________________________
 
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 
ALL ACTIONS 
            
)
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)
Case No.: 13-MD-02430-LHK
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
[REDACTED] 
  
 In this consolidated multi-district litigation, Plaintiffs Keith Dunbar, Brad Scott, Todd 
Harrington, Matthew Knowles, A.K. (next of friend to Minor J.K.), Brent Matthew Scott, Kristen 
Brinkman, Robert Fread, and Rafael Carrillo, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated 
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), allege that Defendant Google, Inc., has violated state and federal anti-
wiretapping laws in its operation of Gmail, an email service.  See ECF No. 38-2.  Before the Court 
is Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Complaint.  See ECF No. 44.  For the 
reasons stated below, the Court DENIES in part and GRANTS in part Google’s Motion to Dismiss 
with leave to amend.      
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profit interests that were unrelated to providing email services to particular users.  Id. ¶¶ 97–98.  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that Google has, since 20 , intercepted emails for the dual purposes 
of providing advertisements and creating user profiles to advance Google’s profit interests.    
2.  Types of Gmail Services 
Gmail implicates several different, but related, systems of email delivery, three of which are 
at issue here.  The first is a free service, which allows any user to register for an account with 
Google to use Gmail.  Id. ¶ 99.  This system is supported by advertisements, though users can opt-
out of such advertising or access Gmail accounts in ways that do not generate advertising, such as 
accessing email on a smartphone.  Id. ¶ 70. 
The second is Google’s operation of email on behalf of Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).  
Id. ¶ 100.  Google, through its Google Apps Partner program, enters into contracts with ISPs, such 
as Cable One, to provide an email service branded by the ISP.  Id.  The ISP’s customers can 
register for email addresses from their ISP (such as “@mycableone.com”), but their email is 
nevertheless powered by Google through Gmail.  
Third, Google operates Google Apps for Education, through which Google provides email 
on behalf of educational organizations for students, faculty, staff, and alumni.  Id. ¶ 101.  These 
users receive “@name.institution.edu” email addresses, but their accounts are also powered by 
Google using Gmail.  Id.  Universities that are part of Google Apps for Education require their 
students to use the Gmail-provided service.  Id.  
Google Apps users, whether through the educational program or the partner program, do 
not receive content-based ads but can opt in to receiving such advertising.  Google processes 
emails sent and received from all Gmail users,1 including Google Apps users, in the same way 
                                                          
1 In this Order, the Court uses “Gmail users” to refer to individuals who send or receive emails 
using the free Gmail service or Google apps.  “Non-Gmail users” refers to email users who do not 
themselves use Gmail (through the free service or Google Apps).  “Google Apps users” refers to 
the subset of Gmail users who access Gmail through either the Google Apps Partner Program or 
Google Apps for Education.  
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except that emails of users who do not receive advertisements are not processed through Google’s 
advertising infrastructure, which attaches targeted advertisements to emails.  Id. ¶¶ 57, 72–73.  This 
means that users who do not receive advertisements would not have been subject to the pre-
 20  interceptions, as during that period, interceptions were for the sole purpose of 
attaching targeted advertisements to emails.  After  20 , Google separated its interception 
of emails for targeted advertising from its interception of emails for creating user profiles.  Id. ¶ 72.  
As a result, after  20 , emails to and from users who did not receive advertisements are 
nevertheless intercepted to create user profiles.  Id. ¶¶ 73, 85.  Accordingly, these post-  
20  interceptions impacted all Gmail and Google Apps users, regardless of whether they received 
advertisements.  
3.  Google’s Agreements with Users 
 The operation of the Gmail service implicates several legal agreements.  Gmail users were 
required to agree to one of two sets of Terms of Service during the class periods.  The first Terms 
of Service was in effect from April 16, 2007, to March 1, 2012, and the second has been in effect 
since March 1, 2012.  Id. ¶ 102.  The 2007 Terms of Service stated that: 
 
Google reserves the right (but shall have no obligation) to pre-screen, review, 
flag, filter, modify, refuse or remove any or all Content from any Service.  For 
some Services, Google may provide tools to filter out explicit sexual content.  
These tools include the SafeSearch preference settings . . . . In addition, there are 
commercially available services and software to limit access to material that you 
may find objectionable.  
 
Id. ¶ 104.  A subsequent section of the 2007 Terms of Service provided that “[s]ome of the 
Services are supported by advertising revenue and may display advertisements and promotions” 
and that “[t]hese advertisements may be content-based to the content information stored on the 
Services, queries made through the Service or other information.”  Id. ¶¶ 107–08. 
The 2012 Terms of Service deleted the above language and stated that users “give Google 
(and those [Google] work[s] with) a worldwide license to use . . ., create derivative works (such as 
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document69   Filed09/26/13   Page4 of 43
 
 
 
5 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
those resulting from translations, adaptations or other changes we make so that your content works 
better with our Services), . . . and distribute such content.”  See ECF No. 46-6 at 3. 
Both Terms of Service reference Google’s Privacy Policies, which have been amended 
three times thus far during the putative class periods.  See ECF Nos. 46-7, 46-8, 46-9, 46-10.  
These Policies, which were largely similar, stated that Google could collect information that users 
provided to Google, cookies, log information, user communications to Google, information that 
users provide to affiliated sites, and the links that a user follows.  See ECF No. 46-7.  The Policies 
listed Google’s provision of “services to users, including the display of customized content and 
advertising” as one of the reasons for the collection of this information.  Id.   
Google also had in place Legal Notices, which stated that “Google does not claim any 
ownership in any of the content, including any text, data, information, images, photographs, music, 
sound, video, or other material, that [users] upload, transmit or store in [their] Gmail account.”  
ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 118.  The Notices further stated that Google “will not use any of [users’] content 
for any purpose except to provide [users] with the service.”  Id. ¶ 121. 
 In addition, Google entered into contractual agreements with ISPs and educational 
institutions as part of its Google Apps Partner and Google Apps for Education programs.  These 
agreements require Google to “protect against unauthorized access to or use of Customer data.”  Id. 
¶¶ 137, 161.  In turn, “Customer data” is defined as “data, including email, provided, generated, 
transmitted, or displayed via the Services by Customers or End Users.”  Id. ¶¶ 138, 162.  Further, 
the Terms of Service applicable to Google Apps Cable One users states that “Google may access, 
preserve, and disclose your account information and any Content associated with that account if 
required to do so by law or in a good faith belief that such access preservation or disclosure is 
reasonably necessary” to satisfy applicable law, enforce the Terms of Service, detect or prevent 
fraud, or protect against imminent harm to the rights of Google, its users, or the public.  ECF No. 
46-2 at 2–3.   
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Importantly, Plaintiffs who are not Gmail or Google Apps users are not subject to any of 
Google’s express agreements.  Because non-Gmail users exchange emails with Gmail users, 
however, their communications are nevertheless subject to the alleged interceptions at issue in this 
case.  
4.  Relief Sought and Class Allegations 
 Plaintiffs bring these cases alleging that Google, in the operation of its Gmail system, 
violated federal and state anti-wiretapping laws.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 216 (federal law), ¶ 288 
(California law), ¶ 328 (Maryland law), ¶ 349 (Florida law), ¶ 370 (Pennsylvania law).  Plaintiffs 
seek the certification of several classes, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory 
relief, statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.  Plaintiffs seek relief on behalf of 
the following classes, all of which have a class period starting two years before the relevant 
complaint was filed and running through the date of class certification, if any:  
(1) all Cable One users who sent a message to a Gmail user and received a reply or received 
an email; 
(2) all Google Apps for Education users who have sent a message to a Gmail user and 
received a reply or received an email;  
(3) all U.S. citizen non-Gmail users (except California residents) who have sent a message 
to a Gmail user and received a reply or received an email from a Gmail user;  
(4)  all U.S. citizen non-Gmail users who have sent a message to a Gmail user and received 
a reply or received an email from a Gmail user;  
(5) all Pennsylvania non-Gmail users who have sent a message to a Gmail user and 
received a reply or received an email from a Gmail user;  
(6) all Florida non-Gmail users who have sent a message to a Gmail user and received a 
reply or received an email from a Gmail user;  
(7) all Maryland non-Gmail users who have sent a message to a Gmail user and received a 
reply or received an email from a Gmail user; and 
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(8) all Gmail users who were under the age of majority and who used Gmail to send an 
email to or received an email from a non-Gmail user or a Gmail user under the age of majority.  Id. 
¶¶ 388–92. 
B.  Procedural History 
This case is a consolidated multi-district litigation involving seven individual and class 
action lawsuits.  See ECF No. 38-2.  The first of these consolidated actions was filed on November 
17, 2010, and transferred from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District of California 
on June 27, 2012.  See Dunbar v. Google, Inc., 12-CV-03305 (N.D. Cal.); ECF No. 179.  Five 
other actions involving substantially similar allegations against Google followed in this District and 
throughout the country.  See Scott, et al. v. Google, Inc., No. 12-CV-03413 (N.D. Cal.); Scott v. 
Google, Inc., No. 12-CV-00614 (N.D. Fla.); A.K. v. Google, Inc., No. 12-CV-01179 (S.D. Ill.); 
Knowles v. Google, Inc., 12-CV-02022 (D. Md.); Brinkman v. Google, Inc., 12-CV-06699 (E.D. 
Pa.).  On April 1, 2013, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a Transfer Order, 
centralizing these six actions in the Northern District of California before the undersigned judge.  
See ECF No. 1.  On May 6, 2013, this Court related a seventh action, Fread v. Google, Inc., 13-
CV-01961 (N.D. Cal.), as part of this multi-district litigation.  See ECF No. 29. 
Plaintiffs filed an Administrative Motion to file their Consolidated Complaint under seal on 
May 16, 2013.2  See ECF No. 38.  The Complaint contained five claims alleging violations of: (1) 
the Wiretap Act, as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510, et seq.; (2) the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code §§ 630, et 
seq.; (3) the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Ann. §§ 10-402, et seq.; (4) Florida 
Statute §§ 934.03, et seq.; and (5) 18 Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 5701, et seq.  See ECF No. 38-2.  
Google filed a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint on June 13, 2013.  See ECF 
No. 44.  On the same day, Google filed two declarations and a request for judicial notice in support 
                                                          
2 The Court resolves this Administrative Motion through a separate order.  
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of its Motion.  See ECF Nos. 45–47.  Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Google’s request for judicial 
notice and separate objections to Google’s declarations on July 11, 2013.  See ECF Nos. 49–50.  
Google filed a reply in support of its request for judicial notice and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ 
objections to Google’s declarations on July 29, 2013.  ECF No. 58.  
Plaintiffs filed their opposition to Google’s Motion to Dismiss on July 11, 2013.  See ECF 
No. 53.  That same day, Plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice in support of their opposition.  
See ECF No. 51.  Google filed a reply along with a declaration in support of the reply on July 29, 
2013.  See ECF No. 56–57.  This Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on September 5, 
2013.  See ECF No. 64.  
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
 A. Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an 
action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.  The plausibility standard is not akin to a 
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).  For purposes 
of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Manzarek 
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).   
However, a court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable 
facts, Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and a “court may look beyond 
the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995).  A 
court is also not required to “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 
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the form of factual allegations.’”  Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (quoting W. Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)).  Mere “conclusory 
allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”  
Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  
Furthermore, “a plaintiff may plead herself out of court” if she “plead[s] facts which establish that 
[s]he cannot prevail on h[er] . . . claim.”  Weisbuch v. Cnty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 B.  Request for Judicial Notice 
 The Court generally may not look beyond the four corners of a complaint in ruling on a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, with the exception of documents incorporated into the complaint by 
reference, and any relevant matters subject to judicial notice.  See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 
756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001).  Under 
the doctrine of incorporation by reference, the Court may consider on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion not 
only documents attached to the complaint, but also documents whose contents are alleged in the 
complaint, provided the complaint “necessarily relies” on the documents or contents thereof, the 
document’s authenticity is uncontested, and the document’s relevance is uncontested.  Coto 
Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); see Lee, 250 F.3d at 688–89.  The 
purpose of this rule is to “prevent plaintiffs from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by deliberately 
omitting documents upon which their claims are based.”  Swartz, 476 F.3d at 763 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Court also may take judicial notice of matters that are either (1) generally known 
within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).  Proper 
subjects of judicial notice when ruling on a motion to dismiss include legislative history reports, 
see Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094, n.1 (9th Cir. 2012); court documents already in the 
public record and documents filed in other courts, see Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th 
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Cir. 2002); and publically accessible websites, see Caldwell v. Caldwell, 2006 WL 618511, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2006); Wible v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 2d 956, 965–66 (C.D. Cal. 
2005). 
 C. Leave to Amend 
If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 
to grant leave to amend.  Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 
“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 
15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.”  Lopez 
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Nonetheless, a court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue 
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., [and] futility of 
amendment.’”  Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (alterations in original). 
III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE  
In support of their opposition to Google’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs request the Court 
take judicial notice of (A) a declaration and a motion filed in Sheppard v. Google, Inc., et al, 12-
CV-4022 (W.D. Ark.); (B) an excerpt of a November 30, 1985 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing 
regarding the ECPA; (C) an April 29, 1968 Senate Report; and (D) an order on Google’s motion to 
dismiss in Marquis v. Google, Inc., No. 11-2808, in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  See ECF No. 51.  Plaintiffs’ Exhibits B and C are legislative 
history reports, and Plaintiffs’ Exhibits A and D are documents filed in other courts, already part of 
the public record.  See Anderson, 673 F.3d at 1094, n.1; Holder, 305 F.3d at 866.  Google does not 
oppose any of these requests.  The Court takes judicial notice of all four.   
Google requests that the Court take judicial notice of (A) a copy of Google’s Terms of 
Service applicable to Google Apps services provided through Cable One, Inc.; (B) a copy of the 
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Google Apps Education Edition Agreement between Google and the University of Hawaii; (C) a 
copy of the Google Apps Education Edition Agreement between Google and the University of the 
Pacific; (D) copies of Google’s Terms of Service dated April 16, 2007 and March 1, 2012; (E) 
copies of Google’s Privacy Policies dated August 7, 2008, March 11, 2009, October 3, 2010, and 
March 1, 2012; (F) a copy of the Yahoo! Mail Privacy Policy from June 2013; (G) an excerpt of an 
October 17, 1986 Senate Report regarding the ECPA; (H) a copy of a May 9, 1995 California 
Senate Judiciary Committee analysis; and (I) a copy of an April 13, 2010 California Senate Public 
Safety Committee analysis.  See ECF No. 47.  Plaintiffs oppose the request for judicial notice with 
respect to items F, G, H, and I.  See ECF No. 49. 
 The Court takes judicial notice of items A, B, C, D, and E as requested by Google and to 
which Plaintiffs do not object because Plaintiffs rely upon and reference these documents in the 
Complaint.  See ECF No. 38-2 ¶¶ 102, 144, 185–86, 189, 227–28, 237–38; Coto, 593 F.3d at 1038.  
The Court further takes judicial notice of items H and I because Plaintiffs “do[] not contest that 
these are readily available public documents or challenge their authenticity.”  Zephyr v. Saxon 
Mortg. Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1226 (E.D. Cal. 2012).  The Court takes judicial notice 
of item G because it is a legislative history report for the statute at the heart of Plaintiffs’ principal 
claim.  See id.; Anderson, 673 F.3d at 1094, n.1.  Finally, the Court denies Google’s request for 
judicial notice of item F, the Yahoo! Mail Privacy Policy.  The Policy is not a document “on which 
the Complaint necessarily relies nor . . . whose relevance and authenticity are uncontested” because 
Plaintiffs contend that the effective dates of the Yahoo! Privacy Policy are unknown.  See ECF No. 
49 at 2–3; Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 Plaintiffs further raise objections to various paragraphs in the declarations supporting 
Google’s Motion to Dismiss and to the requests for judicial notice with respect to some of the 
exhibits attached to the declarations.  See ECF No. 50.  The Court strikes these objections pursuant 
to Civil Local Rule 7-3(a). The Rule requires that any evidentiary objections to a motion be 
contained within the opposition to the motion itself, but Plaintiffs filed their objections separately 
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from their opposition.  See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2011 WL 7036077, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 2, 2011). 
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 
 A.  The Wiretap Act  
 The Wiretap Act, as amended by the ECPA, generally prohibits the interception of “wire, 
oral, or electronic communications.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); see also Joffe v. Google, Inc., No. 11-
17483, 2013 WL 4793247, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013).  More specifically, the Wiretap Act 
provides a private right of action against any person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to 
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see id. § 2520 (providing a private right of 
action for violations of § 2511).  The Act further defines “intercept” as “the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  Id. § 2510(4). 
 Plaintiffs contend that Google violated the Wiretap Act in its operation of the Gmail system 
by intentionally intercepting the content of emails that were in transit to create profiles of Gmail 
users and to provide targeted advertising.  Google contends that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim 
with respect to the Wiretap Act for two reasons.  First, Google contends that there was no 
interception because there was no “device.”  Specifically, Google argues that its reading of any 
emails would fall within the “ordinary course of business” exception to the definition of device.  
ECF No. 44 at 6–13.  Under that exception, “any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or 
facility, or any component thereof . . . being used by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business” is not a “device,” and the use of such 
an instrument accordingly falls outside of the definition of “intercept.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).  
Second, Google contends that all Plaintiffs have consented to any interception.  ECF No. 44 at 13–
20.  Under the statute, it is not unlawful “to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . 
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where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”  18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
1. “Ordinary Course of Business” Exception 
 Google first contends that it did not engage in an interception because its reading of users’ 
emails occurred in the ordinary course of its business.  ECF No. 44 at 6–13.  Conversely, Plaintiffs 
contend that the ordinary course of business exception is narrow and applies only when an 
electronic communication service provider’s actions are “necessary for the routing, termination, or 
management of the message.”  See ECF No. 53 at 7.  The Court finds that the ordinary course of 
business exception is narrow.  The exception offers protection from liability only where an 
electronic communication service provider’s interception facilitates the transmission of the 
communication at issue or is incidental to the transmission of such communication.  Specifically, 
the exception would apply here only if the alleged interceptions were an instrumental part of the 
transmission of email.  Plaintiffs have alleged, however, that Google’s interception is not an 
instrumental component of Google’s operation of a functioning email system.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 97.  
In fact, Google’s alleged interception of email content is primarily used to create user profiles and 
to provide targeted advertising — neither of which is related to the transmission of emails.  See id. 
¶¶ 26–27, 33, 57, 65, 84, 95.  The Court further finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations that Google 
violated Google’s own agreements and internal policies with regard to privacy also preclude 
application of the ordinary course of business exception. 
The plain language of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a), exempts from the definition 
of “device”: 
 
any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component 
thereof,  
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by 
the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such 
subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the 
ordinary course of its business; or  
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(ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service 
in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement 
officer in the ordinary course of his duties; 
 
This section includes two “ordinary course of business” exceptions.  The first, under subsection 
(a)(i), is for users or subscribers of electronic communication services, while the second, 
subsection (a)(ii), applies to the providers of electronic communication services themselves.  This 
case implicates the latter, as Google provides the electronic communication service at issue here, 
Gmail.   
The Sixth Circuit has found that the text of “[t]he two exceptions [is] not altogether clear.”  
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2001).  There is no dispute that 
Google’s interception of Plaintiffs’ emails and subsequent use of the information to create user 
profiles or to provide targeted advertising advanced Google’s business interests.  But this does not 
end the inquiry.  The Court must give effect to the word “ordinary,” which limits “course of 
business” under both exceptions.  The presence of the modifier “ordinary” must mean that not 
everything Google does in the course of its business would fall within the exception.  The task the 
Court faces at this stage is to determine whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the 
purported interceptions were not an “ordinary” part of Google’s business.   
 In the context of section 2510(5)(a)(i), courts have held, consistent with the textual 
limitation that “ordinary” imposes on “course of business,” that not everything that a company may 
want to do falls within the “ordinary course of business” exception.  See e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry 
& Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The phrase ‘in the ordinary course of business’ cannot 
be expanded to mean anything that interests a company.”).  Rather, the business reasons must be 
“legitimate.”  See Arias v. Mut. Cent. Alarm Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 
Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 1003, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that actions are in the ordinary 
course of business if they are “justified by a valid business purpose” or “shown to be undertaken 
normally”). 
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 This limitation, applied to electronic communication service providers in the context of 
section 2510(5)(a)(ii), means that the electronic communication service provider engaged in the 
alleged interception must demonstrate the interception facilitated the communication service or 
was incidental to the functioning of the provided communication service.  For example, in Kirch v. 
Embarq Management Co., 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012), which Google cites, ECF No. 44 at 9, 
the Tenth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Embarq, an ISP, where 
Embarq had intercepted only data incidental to its provision of the internet service.  In that case, 
Embarq had granted a third party, NebuAd, permission to conduct a technology test by acquiring 
information about Embarq’s users so that NebuAd could provide targeted advertising to those 
users.  702 F.3d at 1247.  The Tenth Circuit held that Embarq had not violated the ECPA because 
the ISP could not be liable for NebuAd’s interceptions.  Id. at 1249.  Further, Embarq itself did not 
review any of the raw data that NebuAd collected.  Id. at 1250.  Rather, Embarq had no more 
access than it otherwise would have had as an ISP.  Id.  Embarq’s ordinary course of business as an 
ISP necessarily required that it would have access to data that was transmitted over its equipment.  
Id. at 1249.  The relationship between Embarq and NebuAd’s technology test did not expand the 
universe of data to which Embarq had access beyond the data Embarq could access in its provision 
of internet services.  Id. at 1250.  Accordingly, Embarq’s actions fell within its ordinary course of 
business.  Unlike this case, the only information to which Embarq had access was collected by 
Embarq’s devices that provided internet services.  Id.  In contrast, here, Plaintiffs allege that there 
are separate devices — aside from the devices related to delivery of email — that intercept users’ 
emails.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 259(e).  Considered practically, Google is more akin to NebuAd, which 
intercepted data for the purpose of providing targeted advertising — a purpose separate and apart 
from Embarq’s provision of internet service.  Cf. Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1248.  However, because 
NebuAd settled with the Plaintiffs in Kirch, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion does not deal with 
NebuAd’s liability.  Id. at 1248 n. 2, 1249 (“[W]e need not address whether NebuAd intercepted 
any of the Kirches’ electronic communications.”).  The Court therefore finds that Kirch’s 
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discussion of Embarq’s liability cuts in favor of a narrow reading of the section 2510(5)(a)(ii) 
exception and that Kirch stands only for the narrow proposition that interceptions incidental to the 
provision of the alleged interceptor’s internet service fall within the “ordinary course of business” 
exception.  
 Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005), which also addresses the 
section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception, further suggests that this Court should narrowly read the “ordinary 
course of business” exception.  There, the Second Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment 
and concluded that Earthlink did not violate the ECPA when Earthlink continued to receive and 
store emails sent to an address that had been closed.  The Second Circuit found that the plaintiff in 
that case did not present any evidence that Earthlink’s continued receipt of emails was outside its 
ordinary course of business.  Id. at 505.  The Court noted that Earthlink presented testimony that 
Earthlink routinely continued to receive and store emails after an account was canceled and more 
critically that Earthlink “did not have the ability to bounce e-mail back to senders after the 
termination of an account.”  Id.  Accordingly, in Hall, the email provider’s alleged interceptions 
were a necessary part of its ability to provide email services.  In the instant case, by contrast, 
Plaintiffs have alleged that Google could operate its Gmail system without reading the emails for 
the purposes of targeted advertising or the creation of user profiles.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 97.  Therefore, 
unlike Earthlink, the alleged interception in the instant case is not incidental to the operation of the 
service.3 
                                                          
3 The Court finds that In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, 2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 28, 2012), does not suggest a broader reading of the exception.  Google relies on that case for 
the proposition that as long as Google is using its own devices, Google cannot be intercepting 
users’ information.  ECF No. 44 at 9–10.  Yet, the court in Privacy Policy explicitly noted that the 
use of the device must be in the ordinary course of business.  See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy 
Litigation, 2012 WL 6738343 at *5–6.  Further, unlike that case, the alleged interception in the 
instant case occurred while the email was in transit, rather than when the material was already in 
possession of the intended recipient.  See id. at *6  (dismissing plaintiffs’ cause of action on the 
basis that they “utterly fail . . . to cite any authority that supports either the notion that a provider 
can intercept information already in its possession by violating limitations imposed by a privacy 
policy or the inescapably plain language of the Wiretap Act that excludes from the definition of a 
‘device’ a provider’s own equipment used in the ordinary course of business.”).  The difference 
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In addition to the text and the case law, the statutory scheme and legislative history also 
weigh in favor of a narrow reading of the section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception.  Specifically, a separate 
exception to the Wiretap Act related to electronic service providers states that: 
 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an 
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication 
service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic 
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal 
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary 
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property 
of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication 
service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring 
except for mechanical or service quality control checks. 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).  The statute explicitly limits the use of service 
observing or random monitoring by electronic communication service providers to mechanical and 
service quality control checks.  Id.  Accordingly, the statutory scheme suggests that Congress did 
not intend to allow electronic communication service providers unlimited leeway to engage in any 
interception that would benefit their business models, as Google contends.  In fact, this statutory 
provision would be superfluous if the ordinary course of business exception were as broad as 
Google suggests.  See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (stating that in statutory 
interpretation, courts should “give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute”).  
The legislative history of section 2511(2)(a)(i), which Google cites, ECF No. 44 at 7, also 
supports reading the ordinary course of business exception to require that the interception be 
instrumental to the provision of the service.  A U.S. Senate Report regarding the ECPA states that 
“[t]he provider of electronic communications services may have to monitor a stream of 
transmissions in order to properly route, terminate, and otherwise manage the individual messages 
they contain.  These monitoring functions, which may be necessary to the provision of an 
electronic communication service, do not involve humans listening in on voice conversations.  
Accordingly, they are not prohibited.”  ECF No. 45-2 at 20.  This suggests that Congress intended 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
between communications stored in the recipient’s possession and those in transit is significant for 
the purposes of the statutory scheme as discussed infra. 
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to protect electronic communication service providers from liability when the providers were 
monitoring communications for the purposes of ensuring that the providers could appropriately 
route, terminate, and manage messages.  Accordingly, the Court concludes that the legislative 
history supports a narrow reading of the section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception, under which an electronic 
communication service provider must show some link between the alleged interceptions at issue 
and its ability to operate the communication system.  Google’s broader reading of the exception 
would conflict with Congressional intent.  
The case law applying the “ordinary course of business” exception in the 2510(5)(a)(i) 
context also suggests that courts have narrowly construed that phrase.  For example, in Arias v. 
Mutual Central Alarm Service, Inc., the Second Circuit found that it was within an alarm 
company’s ordinary course of business to record all incoming and outgoing calls because 
maintaining records of the calls was instrumental “to ensure that [the alarm company’s] personnel 
are not divulging sensitive customer information, that events are reported quickly to emergency 
services, that customer claims regarding events are verifiable, and that the police and other 
authorities may rely on these records in conducting any investigations.”   202 F.3d at 559 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted).  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit found that an employer’s 
installation of a telephone monitoring device on the phone lines in departments where employees 
interacted with the public was within the employer’s ordinary course of business because of 
“concern by management over abusive language used by irate customers when called upon to pay 
their bills, coupled with the possible need to give further training and supervision to employees 
dealing with the public.”  James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979).     
 The narrow construction of “ordinary course of business” is most evident in section 
2510(5)(a)(i) cases where an employer has listened in on employees’ phone calls in the workplace.  
See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1396 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[a] substantial body 
of law has developed on the subject of ordinary course of business in the employment field where 
employees have sued their employers” and that “[t]hese cases have narrowly construed the phrase 
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‘ordinary course of business’”); Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582.  These cases suggest that an employer’s 
eavesdropping on an employee’s phone call is only permissible where the employer has given 
notice to the employee.  See Adams, 250 F.3d at 984 (finding that the exception generally requires 
that the use be “(1) for a legitimate business purpose, (2) routine, and (3) with notice”).  Further, 
these cases have suggested that an employer may only listen to an employee’s phone call for the 
narrow purpose of determining whether a call is for personal or business purposes.  In Watkins, for 
example, the court held that an employer “was obliged to cease listening as soon as she had 
determined that the call was personal, regardless of the contents of the legitimately heard 
conversation.”  704 F.2d at 584.  Watkins concerned a situation in which an employer listened in on 
an employee’s personal phone call wherein the employee discussed a job interview.  The Eleventh  
Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer notwithstanding the fact 
that the interception concerned a conversation that was “obviously of interest to the employer.” Id. 
at 583–84. 
These cases suggest a narrow reading of “ordinary course of business” under which there 
must be some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception and the subscriber’s 
ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying service or good.  In the instant 
matter, Plaintiffs explicitly allege that there is no comparable nexus between Google’s 
interceptions and its ability to provide the electronic communication service at issue in this case, 
email.  Specifically, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs state that Google’s interceptions are “for 
[Google’s] own benefit in other Google services unrelated to the service of email or the particular 
user.”  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 97. 
In light of the statutory text, case law, statutory scheme, and legislative history concerning 
the ordinary course of business exception, the Court finds that the section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception 
is narrow and designed only to protect electronic communication service providers against a 
finding of liability under the Wiretap Act where the interception facilitated or was incidental to 
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provision of the electronic communication service at issue.4  Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that 
Google’s reading of their emails was not within this narrow ordinary course of its business.  
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Google intercepts emails for the purposes of creating user 
profiles and delivering targeted advertising, which are not instrumental to Google’s ability to 
transmit emails.  The Consolidated Complaint alleges that “Google uses the content of the email 
messages [Google intercepts] and the derivative data it creates for its own benefit in other Google 
services unrelated to the service of email or the particular user.”  ECF No. 38-2 ¶¶ 97, 259(g).  
Plaintiffs support their assertion by suggesting that Google’s interceptions of emails for targeting 
advertising and creating user profiles occurred independently from the rest of the email-delivery 
system.  In fact, according to the Consolidated Complaint, the Gmail system has always had 
separate processes for spam filtering, antivirus protections, spell checking, language detection, and 
sorting than the devices that perform alleged interceptions that are challenged in this case.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 
200, 259(e).  As such, the alleged interception of emails at issue here is both physically and 
purposively unrelated to Google’s provision of email services.  Id.  ¶¶ 74, 259(g).  Google’s alleged 
interceptions are neither instrumental to the provision of email services, nor are they an incidental 
effect of providing these services.  The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged 
that the interceptions fall outside Google’s ordinary course of business.  
 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has held in a section 2510(5)(a)(i) case that a defendant’s 
actions may fall outside the “ordinary course of business” exception when the defendant violates its 
own internal policies.  See Berry, 146 F.3d at 1010.  In Berry, the court reversed a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the government on “ordinary course of business” grounds 
in part because the interception violated internal policies.  That case concerned a Wiretap Act claim 
                                                          
4 The Court does not find persuasive Google’s slippery slope contention that a narrow 
interpretation of the ordinary course of business exception will make it impossible for electronic 
communication service providers to provide basic features, such as email searches or spam control.  
ECF No. 44 at 12–13.  Some of these may fall within a narrow definition of “ordinary course of 
business” because they are instrumental to the provision of email service.  Further, a service 
provider can seek consent to provide features beyond those linked to the provision of the service.      
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brought by a senior State Department officer against State Department Operations Center Watch 
Officers for monitoring the officer’s phone call with another high-ranking officer.  Id. at 1005.  The 
D.C. Circuit noted that the “Operations Center Manual in effect at the time of these conversations 
cautioned that calls between Senior Department Officials . . . ‘should not be monitored unless they 
so request.’”  Id. at 1006.  The court held that the “government’s position [that this monitoring was 
within its ordinary course of business] is fatally undermined by the Operations Center guidelines 
which clearly indicate the norm of behavior the Watch Officers were to follow and which must be 
regarded as the ordinary course of business for the Center.”  Id. at 1009–10. 
 The Court finds that the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit applies equally in the section 
2510(5)(a)(ii) context.  Here, Plaintiffs allege that Google has violated its own policies and 
therefore is acting outside the ordinary course of business.  Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that 
Google’s Privacy Policies explicitly limit the information that Google may collect to an 
enumerated list of items, and that this list does not include content of emails.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶¶ 
187–91.  Plaintiffs point to the language of the Privacy Policy that states that Google “may collect 
the following types of information” and then lists (1) information provided by the user (such as 
personal information submitted on the sign-up page), (2) information derived from cookies, (3) log 
information, (4) user communications to Google, (5) personal information provided by affiliated 
Google services and sites, (6) information from third party applications, (7) location data, and (8) 
unique application numbers from Google’s toolbar.  Id. ¶ 187; ECF No. 46-7.  Plaintiffs further 
note that the updated Privacy Policy also stated that Google “collected information in two ways”: 
“(1) information the user gives to Google—the user’s personal information; and, (2) information 
Google obtains from the user’s use of Google services, wherein Google lists: (a) the user’s device 
information; (b) the user’s log information; (c) the user’s location information; (d) the user’s 
unique application number; (e) information stored locally on the user’s device; and, (e) [sic] 
information derived from cookies placed on a user’s device.”  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 189; ECF No. 46-
10.  Because content of emails between users or between users and non-users was not part of either 
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list, Plaintiffs allege that Google “violates the express limitations of its Privacy Policies.”  Id. ¶¶ 
191, 195.  The Court need not determine at this stage whether Plaintiffs will ultimately be able to 
prove that the Privacy Policies were intended to comprehensively list the information Google may 
collect.  Rather, Plaintiffs’ plausible allegations that the Privacy Policies were exhaustive are 
sufficient.  Because Plaintiffs have alleged that Google exceeded the scope of its own Privacy 
Policy, the section 2510(5)(a)(ii) exception cannot apply.  
  Accordingly, the Court DENIES Google’s Motion to Dismiss based on the section 
2510(5)(a)(ii) exception.5   
  2. Consent 
 Google’s second contention with respect to Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim is that all 
Plaintiffs consented to any interception of emails in question in the instant case.  Specifically, 
Google contends that by agreeing to its Terms of Service and Privacy Policies, all Gmail users 
have consented to Google reading their emails.  ECF No. 44 at 14–16.  Google further suggests that 
even though non-Gmail users have not agreed to Google’s Terms of Service or Privacy Policies, all 
non-Gmail users impliedly consent to Google’s interception when non-Gmail users send an email 
to or receive an email from a Gmail user.  Id. at 19–21.  
If either party to a communication consents to its interception, then there is no violation of 
the Wiretap Act.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).6  Consent to an interception can be explicit or implied, 
but any consent must be actual.  See United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996); 
                                                          
5 The Court notes that it is not the first court to reject Google’s ordinary course of business 
exception theory on a motion to dismiss a challenge to the operation of Gmail.  A federal district 
court in Texas ruled that it could not decide the question of ordinary course of business at the 
motion to dismiss phase.  See Dunbar v. Google, Inc., No. 10-CV-00194-MHS, ECF No. 61 (E.D. 
Tex. May 23, 2011).  A state court in Massachusetts also rejected a similar claim under state law.  
Marquis v. Google, Inc., No. 11-2808-BLSI (Mass Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012).    
6 However, to establish a consent defense under the state laws at issue in this case, both parties — 
the sender and the recipient of the communication — must consent to the alleged interception.  See 
Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d); Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(3); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5704(4).  
Because the Court finds that no party has consented to any of the interceptions at issue in this case, 
the difference between the federal law’s one-party consent regime and the state laws’ two-party 
consent regimes is not relevant at this stage.  
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U.S. v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Corona-Chavez. 328 F.3d 974, 978 (8th 
Cir.  2003).  Courts have cautioned that implied consent applies only in a narrow set of cases.  See 
Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581 (holding that consent should not be “cavalierly implied”); In re 
Pharmatak, 329 F.3d at 20.  The critical question with respect to implied consent is whether the 
parties whose communications were intercepted had adequate notice of the interception.  Berry, 
146 F.3d at 1011.  That the person communicating knows that the interceptor has the capacity to 
monitor the communication is insufficient to establish implied consent.  Id.  Moreover, consent is 
not an all-or-nothing proposition.  Rather, “[a] party may consent to the interception of only part of 
a communication or to the interception of only a subset of its communications.”  In re 
Pharmatrack, Inc., 329 F.3d at 19.  
 In its Motion to Dismiss, Google marshals both explicit and implied theories of consent.  
Google contends that by agreeing to Google’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policies, Plaintiffs 
who are Gmail users expressly consented to the interception of their emails.  ECF No. 44 at 14–16.  
Google further contends that because of the way that email operates, even non-Gmail users knew 
that their emails would be intercepted, and accordingly that non-Gmail users impliedly consented 
to the interception.  Id. at 19–20.  Therefore, Google argues that in all communications, both 
parties — regardless of whether they are Gmail users — have consented to the reading of emails.  
Id. at 13–14.  The Court rejects Google’s contentions with respect to both explicit and implied 
consent.  Rather, the Court finds that it cannot conclude that any party — Gmail users or non-
Gmail users — has consented to Google’s reading of email for the purposes of creating user 
profiles or providing targeted advertising.  
 Google points to its Terms of Service and Privacy Policies, to which all Gmail and Google 
Apps users agreed, to contend that these users explicitly consented to the interceptions at issue.  
The Court finds, however, that those policies did not explicitly notify Plaintiffs that Google would 
intercept users’ emails for the purposes of creating user profiles or providing targeted advertising.   
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Section 8 of the Terms of Service that were in effect from April 16, 2007, to March 1, 2012, 
stated that “Google reserves the right (but shall have no obligation) to pre-screen, review, flag, 
filter, modify, refuse or remove any or all Content from any Service.”7   ECF No. 46-5 at 4.  This 
sentence was followed by a description of steps users could take to avoid sexual and objectionable 
material.  Id. (“For some of the Services, Google may provide tools to filter out explicit sexual 
content.”).  Later, section 17 of the Terms of Service stated that “advertisements may be targeted to 
the content of information stored on the Services, queries made through the Services or other 
information.”  Id. at 8. 
The Court finds that Gmail users’ acceptance of these statements does not establish explicit 
consent.  Section 8 of the Terms of Service suggests that content may be intercepted under a 
different set of circumstances for a different purpose — to exclude objectionable content, such as 
sexual material.  This does not suggest to the user that Google would intercept emails for the 
purposes of creating user profiles or providing targeted advertising.  Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582 
(“[C]onsent within the meaning of section 2511(2)(d) is not necessarily an all or nothing 
proposition; it can be limited.  It is the task of the trier of fact to determine the scope of the consent 
and to decide whether and to what extent the interception exceeded that consent.”); In re 
Pharmatrack, Inc., 329 F.3d at 19 (“Thus, a reviewing court must inquire into the dimensions of 
the consent and then ascertain whether the interception exceeded those boundaries.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, to the extent that section 8 of the Terms of Service 
establishes consent, it does so only for the purpose of interceptions to eliminate objectionable 
content.  The Consolidated Complaint suggests, however, that Gmail’s interceptions for the 
purposes of targeted advertising and creation of user profiles was separate from screening for any 
objectionable content.  See ECF No. 38-2 ¶¶ 5, 200.  Because the two processes were allegedly 
separate, consent to one does not equate to consent to the other.   
                                                          
7 It is undisputed that the term “Service” throughout Google’s Terms of Service includes Gmail.  
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Section 17 of the Terms of Service — which states that Google’s “advertisements may be 
targeted to the content of information stored on the Services, queries made through the Services or 
other information” — is defective in demonstrating consent for a different reason: it demonstrates 
only that Google has the capacity to intercept communications, not that it will.  Berry, 146 F.3d at 
1011 (holding that knowledge of defendant’s capacity to monitor is insufficient to establish 
consent).  Moreover, the language suggests only that Google’s advertisements were based on 
information “stored on the Services” or “queries made through the Services” — not information in 
transit via email.  Plaintiffs here allege that Google violates the Wiretap Act, which explicitly 
protects communications in transit, as distinguished from communications that are stored.  
Furthermore, providing targeted advertising is only one of the alleged reasons for the interceptions 
at issue in this case.  Plaintiffs also allege that Google intercepted emails for the purposes of 
creating user profiles.  See ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 95.  Section 17, to the extent that it suggests 
interceptions, only does so for the purposes of providing advertising, not creating user profiles.  
Accordingly, the Court finds that neither section of the Terms of Service establishes consent.   
 The Privacy Policies in effect from August 8, 2008, to October 3, 2010, to which all Gmail 
users agreed and upon which Google now relies, do not clarify Google’s role in intercepting 
communications between its users.  The Policies stated that Google may collect “[i]nformation you 
provide, [c]ookies[,] [l]og information[,] [u]ser communications to Google[,] [a]ffiliated sites, 
[l]inks[,] [and] [o]ther sites.”  See ECF No. 46-7 at 2–3.  Google described that it used such 
information for the purposes of “[p]roviding our services to users, including the display of 
customized content and advertising.”  Id. at 3.  In 2010, Google later updated the Policy to state 
that the collected information would be used to “[p]rovide, maintain, protect, and improve our 
services (including advertising services) and develop new services.”  See ECF No. 46-9 at 3.  
Nothing in the Policies suggests that Google intercepts email communication in transit between 
users, and in fact, the policies obscure Google’s intent to engage in such interceptions.  The 
Privacy Policies explicitly state that Google collects “user communications . . . to Google.”  See 
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ECF No. 46-7 at 3 (emphasis added).  This could mislead users into believing that user 
communications to each other or to nonusers were not intercepted and used to target advertising or 
create user profiles.  As such, these Privacy Policies do not demonstrate explicit consent, and in 
fact suggest the opposite. 
 After March 1, 2012, Google modified its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.  The new 
policies are no clearer than their predecessors in establishing consent.  The relevant part of the new 
Terms of Service state that when users upload content to Google, they “give Google (and those 
[Google] work[s] with) a worldwide license to use . . ., create derivative works (such as those 
resulting from translations, adaptations or other changes we make so that your content works better 
with our Services), . . . and distribute such content.”  See ECF No. 46-6 at 3.  The Terms of Service 
cite the new Privacy Policy, in which Google states to users that Google “may collect information 
about the services that you use and how you use them, like when you visit a website that uses our 
advertising services or you view and interact with our ads and content.  This information includes: 
[d]evice information[,] [l]og information[,] [l]ocation information[,] [u]nique application 
numbers[,] [l]ocal storage[,] [c]ookies[,] and anonymous identifiers.”  ECF No. 46-10 at 3.  The 
Privacy Policy further states that Google “use[s] the information [it] collect[s] from all [its] 
services to provide, maintain, protect and improve them, to develop new ones, and to protect 
Google and [its] users.  [Google] also use[s] this information to offer you tailored content — like 
giving you more relevant search results and ads.”  See ECF No. 46-10 at 3.  These new policies do 
not specifically mention the content of users’ emails to each other or to or from non-users; these 
new policies are not broad enough to encompass such interceptions.  Furthermore, the policies do 
not put users on notice that their emails are intercepted to create user profiles.  The Court therefore 
finds that a reasonable Gmail user who read the Privacy Policies would not have necessarily 
understood that her emails were being intercepted to create user profiles or to provide targeted 
advertisements.  Accordingly, the Court finds that it cannot conclude at this phase that the new 
policies demonstrate that Gmail user Plaintiffs consented to the interceptions.   
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Finally, Google contends that non-Gmail users — email users who do not have a Gmail 
account and who did not accept Gmail’s Terms of Service or Privacy Policies — nevertheless 
impliedly consented to Google’s interception of their emails to and from Gmail users, and to 
Google’s use of such emails to create user profiles and to provide targeted advertising.  ECF No. 
44 at 19–20.  Google’s theory is that all email users understand and accept the fact that email is 
automatically processed.  Id.  However, the cases Google cites for this far-reaching proposition 
hold only that the sender of an email consents to the intended recipients’ recording of the email — 
not, as has been alleged here, interception by a third-party service provider.  See State v. Townsend, 
57 P.3d 255, 260 (Wash. 2002) (finding consent and therefore no violation of Washington’s 
privacy act when email and instant message communications sent to an undercover police officer 
were used against criminal defendant); State v. Lott, 879 A.2d 1167, 1172 (N.H. 2005) (same under 
New Hampshire law); Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding 
that the Pennsylvania anti-wiretapping law was not violated when the recipient forwarded emails 
and chat messages to the police).  Google has cited no case that stands for the proposition that users 
who send emails impliedly consent to interceptions and use of their communications by third 
parties other than the intended recipient of the email.  Nor has Google cited anything that suggests 
that by doing nothing more than receiving emails from a Gmail user, non-Gmail users have 
consented to the interception of those communications.  Accepting Google’s theory of implied 
consent — that by merely sending emails to or receiving emails from a Gmail user, a non-Gmail 
user has consented to Google’s interception of such emails for any purposes — would eviscerate 
the rule against interception.  See Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581 (“It would thwart th[e] policy [of 
protecting privacy] if consent could routinely be implied from circumstances.”).8  The Court does 
                                                          
8 In their briefs, the parties dispute whether members of the putative class of Gmail users who are 
minors consented to the interceptions.  Google contends that minors are bound by the Terms of 
Service and Privacy Policies.  ECF No. 44 at 16–17.  Google argues that the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–08, preempts any state law that would have rendered 
the minors’ consent ineffective.  The Court need not reach the issue of whether minors are bound 
by the Terms of Service or the Privacy Policies because the Court concludes that even if the minors 
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not find that non-Gmail users who are not subject to Google’s Privacy Policies or Terms of Service 
have impliedly consented to Google’s interception of their emails to Gmail users.     
Because Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they have not explicitly or implicitly 
consented to Google’s interceptions, the Court DENIES Google’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
of consent.9  
B. CIPA 
 CIPA, Cal. Penal Code § 630, et seq., California’s anti-wiretapping and anti-eavesdropping 
statute, prohibits unauthorized interceptions of communications in order “to protect the right of 
privacy.”  Cal. Penal Code § 630.  The California Legislature enacted CIPA in 1967 in response to 
“advances in science and technology [that] have led to the development of new devices and 
techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications.”  Id.  
Section 631 prohibits wiretapping or “any other unauthorized connection” with a “wire, 
line, cable, or instrument.”  See Cal. Penal Code § 631(a).  The California Supreme Court has held 
that section 631 protects against three distinct types of harms: “intentional wiretapping, willfully 
attempting to learn the contents or meaning of a communication in transit over a wire, and 
attempting to use or communicate information obtained as a result of engaging in either of the 
previous two activities.”   Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 583 P.2d 737, 741 (Cal. 1978).  Section 
632 prohibits unauthorized electronic eavesdropping on confidential conversations.  See Cal. Penal 
Code § 632(a).  To state a claim under section 632, a plaintiff must allege an electronic recording 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
are subject to these agreements, the agreements did not establish consent.  Similarly, Google 
contends that Google Apps users are also bound by the Terms of Service and Privacy Policies even 
though they were required by their educational institutions or ISPs to use Gmail.  ECF No. 44 at 
17–18.  Again, because the Court concludes that the agreements did not establish consent, the 
Court need not reach the issue of whether Google Apps users are bound by the agreements. 
9 Other courts have also rejected Google’s consent defense against state and federal anti-
wiretapping challenges to the operation of Gmail.  See Dunbar v. Google, Inc., No. 10-cv-00194-
MHS, ECF No. 61 (E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011); Marquis v. Google, Inc., No. 11-2808-BLSI (Mass 
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012).  
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of or eavesdropping on a confidential communication, and that not all parties consented to the 
eavesdropping.  Flanagan v. Flanagan, 41 P.3d 575, 577 (Cal. 2002).   
CIPA also contains a public utility exemption, which applies to claims under both sections 
631 and 632.  Cal. Penal Code §§ 631(b), 632(e).  Neither section applies “to any public utility 
engaged in the business of providing communications services and facilities, or to the officers, 
employees, or agents thereof, where the acts otherwise prohibited by this section are for the 
purpose of construction, maintenance, conduct or operation of the services and facilities of the 
public utility.”  Cal. Penal Code §§ 631(b), 632(e).  
Plaintiffs allege violations of both section 631 and section 632.  See ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 321.  
Google moves to dismiss on five bases.  See ECF No. 44 at 23–24, 27–28.  Google contends that 
Plaintiffs lack standing to allege such violations and that the California law should not apply due to 
choice of law principles.  See id.  Google also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on substantive 
bases, contending that neither section 631 nor section 632 applies to email and that the public 
utility exemption applies.  See ECF No. 44 at 21–23, ECF No. 56 at 14–15.  Finally, Google moves 
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ section 632 claim because the communications at issue in this case were not 
confidential as defined by that section and because that section is preempted by the ECPA.  See 
ECF No. 44 at 25–27. 
  1.  Standing 
 Google first contends that Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III to assert a CIPA claim.  
A federal court must ask whether a plaintiff has suffered sufficient injury to satisfy the “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.  ECF No. 44 at 23–24.  To satisfy 
Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized, as 
well as actual or imminent; (2) wherein injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant; and (3) it is likely (not merely speculative) that injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 
(2000); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  A suit brought by a plaintiff 
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without Article III standing is not a “case or controversy,” and an Article III federal court therefore 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.  
Google’s contention is that Plaintiffs have not suffered the “injury” required by Article III 
to confer standing.  ECF No. 44 at 24.  Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the injury required by 
Article III may exist by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.”  See Edwards v. First Am. Fin. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).  In such cases, the “standing question . . . is whether the 
constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as 
granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”  Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. 
at 500).  In Edwards, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(“RESPA”) conferred standing to a homeowner who sought to challenge the kickback relationship 
between the title insurer and title agency despite the fact that the homeowner suffered no 
independent injury, through, for example, overpayment.  Id.  The court there held that the structure 
of RESPA was such that independent injury was not needed; a plaintiff’s showing that the 
defendant’s conduct violated the statute was sufficient to confer standing.  Id. 10   
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edwards, courts in this district have found that 
allegations of a Wiretap Act violation are sufficient to establish standing.  In In re Facebook 
Privacy Litigation, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (N.D. Cal. 2011), for example, the court held that the 
“Wiretap Act provides that any person whose electronic communication is ‘intercepted, disclosed, 
or intentionally used’ in violation of the Act may in a civil action recover from the entity which 
engaged in that violation.”  Accordingly, the court found that where the plaintiffs had alleged that 
                                                          
10 The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in Edwards on the 
question of whether statutory injury alone could confer standing under Article III even though the 
Courts of Appeal that had considered the question had unanimously concluded that allegations of 
RESPA violations alone sufficed for standing.  See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 131 S. Ct. 
3022 (2011).  After oral argument, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ as 
improvidently granted.  See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012).  This left in 
place the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edwards, which remains binding authority that this Court 
must apply, as it does here.   
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document69   Filed09/26/13   Page30 of 43
 
 
 
31 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
their communications had been intercepted, they “alleged facts sufficient to establish that they have 
suffered the injury required for standing under Article III.”  Id. at 712; see also In re iPhone 
Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[A] violation of the Wiretap Act 
. . . may serve as a concrete injury for the purposes of Article III injury analysis.”); In re Google, 
Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012) (“[If viable], Plaintiffs’ 
Wiretap Act claim might help [show standing], [because] a violation of the rights provided under 
the statute may be sufficient by itself to confer standing.”)  
The reasoning of these cases that find standing when there is an allegation of a Wiretap Act 
violation applies equally to CIPA.  Like the Wiretap Act, CIPA creates a private right of action 
when a defendant engages in wiretapping or eavesdropping.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) 
(“[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or 
entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation), with Cal. Penal Code  
§ 637.2(a) (“Any person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an action 
against the person who committed the violation.”).  Further, like the Wiretap Act, CIPA authorizes 
an award of statutory damages any time a defendant violates the provisions of the statute without 
any need to show actual damages.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (authorizing statutory damages), 
with Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a)(1) (same) and Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(c) (“It is not a necessary 
prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened 
with, actual damages.”).  Therefore, the Court finds that the allegation of a violation of CIPA, like 
an allegation of the violation of the Wiretap Act, is sufficient to confer standing without any 
independent allegation of injury.  Like both RESPA and the Wiretap Act, therefore, CIPA creates a 
statutory right the violation of which confers standing on a plaintiff.  
Google relies exclusively on the differences in statutory text between CIPA and the Wiretap 
Act to contend that CIPA requires an independent allegation of injury even where the Wiretap Act 
does not.  Specifically, Google notes that the provision of CIPA that creates a cause of action states 
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that, “[a]ny person who has been injured by a violation of this chapter may bring an action against 
the person who committed the violation.”  Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a) (emphasis added).  Google’s 
contention is that the word “injured” means that Plaintiffs must show some injury independent of 
the invasion of their statutory rights under CIPA.  Google cites no authority for the proposition that 
section 637.2 requires independent injury or the proposition that the word “injured” triggers an 
obligation to demonstrate independent injury for the purposes of Article III standing.  The 
California case law on CIPA cuts against Google’s contention that “injured” requires independent 
injury.  As the California Court of Appeals has stated, “Section 637.2 is fairly read as establishing 
that no violation of the Privacy Act [CIPA] is to go unpunished.  Any invasion of privacy involves 
an affront to human dignity which the Legislature could conclude is worth at least $3,000.  The 
right to recover this statutory minimum accrued at the moment the Privacy Act [CIPA] was 
violated.”  Friddle v. Epstein, 21 Cal. Rptr. 85, 92 (Cal Ct. App. 1993); see also id. (“Plaintiff 
invaded defendants’ privacy and violated the Privacy Act [CIPA] at the moment he began making 
his secret recording.  No subsequent action or inaction is of consequence to this conclusion.”); 
accord Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 365 (Cal. 1985) (“In view of the manifest legislative 
purpose to accord every citizen’s privacy the utmost sanctity, section 637.2 was intended to 
provide those who suffer an infringement of this aspect of their personal liberty a means of 
vindicating their right.”).  
Accordingly, the Court finds that CIPA and the Wiretap Act are not distinguishable for the 
purposes of standing.  Because courts have, under existing Ninth Circuit authority, consistently 
held that the invasion of rights under the Wiretap Act is sufficient for Article III standing, this 
Court concludes that the same is true of CIPA.  All Plaintiffs need allege is an invasion of statutory 
CIPA rights to survive a motion to dismiss on standing grounds.  There is no dispute that they have 
done so here.  The Court therefore DENIES Google’s Motion to Dismiss the CIPA claims on 
standing grounds.  
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2. Choice of Law  
 Google contends that under choice of law principles, California law should not apply and 
that the Court should accordingly dismiss Plaintiffs’ California claims.  ECF No. 44 at 27–30.  
Plaintiffs contend that the choice of law analysis should wait for later stages of the proceedings.  
ECF No. 53 at 28.  As set forth below, the choice of law inquiry raises complicated, fact-intensive 
questions better answered at later stages of the litigation.  Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion 
to Dismiss on choice of law grounds. 
To determine which state’s law should apply, “[a] federal court . . . must look to the forum 
state’s choice of law rules to determine the controlling substantive law.”  Mazza v. American 
Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Under California law, class action plaintiffs have the burden to “show that California has sufficient 
contact or sufficient aggregation of contacts to the claims of each class member.”  Id. at 589–90 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  If this showing is made, “the burden shifts to the other side to 
demonstrate that foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to class claims.”  Id. at 590. 
“California courts apply the so-called governmental interest analysis” to determine whether 
California law should be applied on a class-wide basis.”  Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 
137 P.3d 914, 917 (Cal. 2006).  Under this three-part test: “[1] the court determines whether the 
relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in 
question is the same or different . . .[; 2] if there is a difference, the court examines each 
jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular 
case to determine whether a true conflict exists . . . [; and 3] if the court finds there is a true 
conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of each 
jurisdiction in the application of its own law . . . and then ultimately applies the law of the state 
whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied.”  Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590 
(quoting McCann v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 225 P.3d 517, 527 (Cal. 2010)). 
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The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established that their claims are sufficiently related to 
California to trigger application of the three-part test.  The Ninth Circuit has held that sufficient 
aggregate contacts with California are established in a class action when a defendant’s corporate 
headquarters is located in the state, advertising materials pertaining to representations the company 
made to class members are created in the state, and one fifth of the class is located in California.  
Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590.  In this case, as Plaintiffs allege, Google is located in California, it 
developed and implemented the practices at issue in this action in California, and one or more of 
the physical interceptions at the heart of Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in California.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 
290 (“Google’s acts in violation of CIPA occurred in the State of California . . . . Google’s 
implementation of its business decisions, practices, and standard ongoing policies which violate 
CIPA took place in the State of California. Google profited in the State of California”); ECF No. 
53 at 29.  In short, California is the epicenter of the practices at issue in this case for all Plaintiffs.  
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that “California has a constitutionally 
sufficient aggregation of contacts to the claims of each putative class member.”  Mazza, 666 F.3d 
at 590. 
 Because the Court finds sufficient aggregate contacts, it turns to the first of the three-part 
inquiry to determine whether California law or the law of another state should apply to the class 
claims.  The Court must determine whether there is a material conflict between the laws of 
California and those of the Plaintiffs’ home states.  Google contends that there is a conflict because 
Alabama and Maryland law are narrower with respect to scope of liability, enforcement 
mechanisms, and available remedies.  ECF No. 44 at 28.  
 The Court cannot, at this stage, determine whether there are differences with respect to the 
scope of liability.  Google correctly contends that under Alabama and Maryland’s law, one party’s 
consent is sufficient to negate an interception, while under California law, both parties must 
consent.  Id.  Yet, it is not clear whether this difference in the scope of liability is material, that is 
whether, it “make[s] a difference in this litigation.”  Mazza, 666 F.3d at 590.  This is because 
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Plaintiffs contend that neither party has consented, while Google contends that all parties have 
consented.  ECF No. 38-2 ¶ 102–97, ECF No. 44 at 13–14.  Accordingly, on either party’s theory 
of liability, the difference in state law with respect to the consent standard would not be a material 
difference.    
Therefore, the Court finds that it cannot conduct a meaningful choice of law analysis, such 
as that contemplated by Mazza, at this early stage of the litigation where the issues of contention 
are still in flux.11  As other courts have noted, the rigorous choice of law analysis required by 
Mazza cannot be conducted at the motion to dismiss stage.  See Clancy v. The Bromley Tea Co., 
2013 WL 4081632 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (“Such a detailed choice-of-law analysis is not 
appropriate at [the motion for judgment on the pleadings] stage of the litigation. Rather, such a 
fact-heavy inquiry should occur during the class certification stage, after discovery.”); In re Clorox 
Consumer Litig., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Significantly, Mazza was decided 
on a motion for class certification, not a motion to strike.  At [the motion to dismiss] stage of the 
instant litigation, a detailed choice-of-law analysis would be inappropriate.  Since the parties have 
yet to develop a factual record, it is unclear whether applying different state consumer protection 
statutes could have a material impact on the viability of Plaintiffs’ claims.”) (citation omitted);  
Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Although Mazza may 
influence the decision whether to certify the proposed class and subclass, such a determination is 
premature.  At [the motion to dismiss] stage in the litigation—before the parties have submitted 
briefing regarding either choice-of-law or class certification—plaintiff is permitted to assert claims 
under the laws of different states in the alternative.”); In re Sony Grand Wega KDF-E A10/A20 
Series Rear Projection HDTV Television Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“In a 
                                                          
11 The Court recognizes that additional conflicts may arise out of California’s acknowledgement of 
a private right of action and/or the remedies California allows under CIPA.  However, under 
California choice of law analysis, differences in remedies alone are not dispositive.  The Court may 
resolve the conflict between California and foreign law by “apply[ing] California law in a 
restrained manner” with regard to monetary damages.  Kearney, 39 Cal. 4th at 100–01.  In any 
case, the Court will resolve all conflict of law questions at the class certification stage. 
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putative class action, the Court will not conduct a detailed choice-of-law analysis during the 
pleading stage.”). 
Accordingly, the Court defers resolution of the choice of law issues until the class 
certification phase and DENIES Google’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis of choice of law without 
prejudice to Google raising this argument at a later stage.   
3.  Section 631 
Google contends that even if Plaintiffs’ section 631 challenge is not procedurally barred, it 
is substantively deficient because that section does not apply to emails.  ECF No. 44 at 21–23.  
Further, in its reply brief, Google contends that the public utility exemption applies.  ECF No. 56 at 
14–15.  
  a. Application to Email 
The Court finds that there is no binding authority with respect to whether section 631 
applies to email.12  The only authority from the California courts is a Superior Court ruling.  See 
Diamond v. Google, Inc., CIV-1202715 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin Cnty. Aug. 14, 2013) (finding, 
without providing analysis, that allegations of interception of email communication are sufficient 
to state a claim under Cal. Penal Code § 631).  While two federal courts have been confronted with 
the application of CIPA to Internet browsing history and emails, those matters were resolved on 
other grounds before reaching the question of CIPA’s application to digital technologies generally 
or email specifically.  Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Bradley 
v. Google, 2006 WL 3798134, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006). 
In the absence of binding authority, this Court must predict what the California Supreme 
Court would do if confronted with this issue.  See Valentine, 804 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.  The Court 
begins by looking to the text.  Section 631 establishes liability for: 
 
                                                          
12 California courts have, however, applied section 632 to internet communication technologies.  
See People v. Nakai, 183 Cal. App. 4th 499 (2010); People v. Cho, 2010 WL 4380113 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 5, 2010); People v. Griffitt, 2010 WL 5006815 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010). 
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[a]ny person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any 
other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether 
physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any 
telegraphic or telephone wire, line cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, 
cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system, or who 
willfully or without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any 
unauthorized manner, reads or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or 
meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or 
passing over any wire, line or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place 
within this state. 
Cal. Penal Code § 631.  Google contends that the language “reads or attempts to read, or to learn 
the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or 
passing over any wire, line or cable” applies only to interception of content on telephone and 
telegraphic wires, lines, or cables, as the first clause of the statute describes.  ECF No. 44 at 21.  As 
a result, Google contends that the second clause, upon which Plaintiffs rely, cannot apply to email 
since emails are not messages, reports or communications that pass over telephone or telegraphic 
wires.  Id.  
 The Court rejects Google’s reading of the statute.  As a threshold matter, the second clause 
of the statute, which creates liability for individuals who “read[] or attempt[] to read, or to learn the 
contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or 
passing over any wire, line or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this 
state[,]” is not limited to communications passing over “telegraphic or telephone” wires, lines, or 
cables.  See Cal. Penal Code § 631 (emphasis added).  Furthermore, the Court finds no reason to 
conclude that the limitation of “telegraphic or telephone” on “wire, line, cable, or instrument” in 
the first clause of the statute should be imported to the second clause of the statute.  The second 
clause applies only to “wire[s], line[s], or cable[s]” — not “instrument[s,]” which are included in 
the first clause.  The Court finds that this difference in coverage between the first and second 
clauses suggests that the Legislature intended the two clauses to apply to different types of 
communications.  Accordingly, the Court rejects Google’s contention that the limitations in the 
first clause must also apply to the second clause.  The Court therefore finds that the plain language 
of the statute is broad enough to encompass email.    
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 Further, the California Supreme Court’s repeated finding that the California legislature 
intended for CIPA to establish broad privacy protections supports an expansive reading of the 
statute.  See Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 581 (“In enacting [CIPA], the Legislature declared in broad 
terms its intent to protect the right of privacy of the people of this state from what it perceived as a 
serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties.  This philosophy appears to lie at the heart 
of virtually all the decisions construing [CIPA].”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 
Ribas v. Clark, 696 P.2d 637, 641 (Cal. 1985) (finding it is “probable” that the legislature designed 
Section 631 as a catch all to “proscrib[e] attempts to circumvent other aspects of the Privacy Act, 
e.g., by requesting a secretary to secretly transcribe a conversation over an extension, rather than 
tape recording it in violation of section 632”); Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 583 P.2d 737, 742 
(Cal. 1978) (“Th[e] forceful expression of the constitutional stature of privacy rights [in California] 
reflects a concern previously evinced by the Legislature in enacting the invasion of privacy 
provisions of the Penal Code.”).  
Moreover, the California Supreme Court regularly reads statutes to apply to new 
technologies where such a reading would not conflict with the statutory scheme.  For example, in a 
previous evolution in communications technology, the California Supreme Court interpreted 
“telegraph” functionally, based on the type of communication it enabled.  In Davis v. Pacific 
Telephone & Telegraph, the Supreme Court held that “telegraph lines” in a criminal law 
proscribing the cutting of lines included telephone lines because “[t]he idea conveyed by each term 
is the sending of intelligence to a distance . . . [thus] the term ‘telegraph’ means any apparatus for 
transmitting messages by means of electric currents and signals.”  Davis v. Pacific Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 59 P. 698, 699 (Cal. 1899); see also Apple v. Superior Court, 292 P.2d 883, 887 
(Cal. 2013) (“Fidelity to legislative intent does not make it impossible to apply a legal text to 
technologies that did not exist when the text was created.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In line with the plain language of the statute, the California Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements regarding the broad legislative intent underlying CIPA to protect privacy, and the 
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California courts’ approach to updating obsolete statutes in light of emerging technologies, the 
Court finds that section 631 of CIPA applies to emails.  
  b.  Public Utility Exemption 
 Google contends that even if CIPA applies to emails, it is a “public utility” that is exempt 
from the statute.  ECF No. 56 at 14–15.  The Court declines to reach this conclusion.  California’s 
Constitution defines “public utilities” as “[p]rivate corporations and persons that own, operate, 
control, or manage a line, plant, or system for . . . the transmission of telephone and telegraph 
messages . . . directly or indirectly to or for the public.”  Cal. Const., art. XII, § 3.  The California 
Public Utility Code further defines this definition of “public utility” as “every common carrier  
. . . , telephone corporation [or] telegraph corporation . . ., where the service is performed for, or the 
commodity is delivered to, the public or any portion thereof.”  Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 216(a).  The 
Public Utility Code further specifies that a “telegraph corporation” is “every corporation or person 
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any telegraph line for compensation within this 
State.”  Id. § 236 (emphasis added).  “Telegraph line” is defined as “all conduits, ducts, poles, 
wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property 
owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by 
telegraph, whether such communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires.”  Id. 
§ 235.  The code uses analogous definitions for “telephone corporations” and “telephone lines.”  Id. 
§§ 233, 234.  
In short, in California, a “public utility” is a precisely defined entity subject to an expansive 
and exacting regulatory regime.  Under the plain language of the statutes, merely operating a 
service over a telephone or telegraph line does not render a company a public utility.  Rather, the 
critical question is whether the company owns, controls, operates or manages a telephone or 
telegraph line.  Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 236.  Nothing in the record suggests that Google owns, 
controls, operates, or manages a telephone or telegraph lines in California.  Accordingly, the Court 
finds that Google is not a “public utility” and thus does not qualify for the public utility exemption 
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of Cal. Penal Code §§ 631(b).  The Court therefore DENIES Google’s Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ section 631 claims.   
 4.  Section 632 
To state a claim under California Penal Code § 632, a plaintiff must prove (1) an electronic 
recording of or eavesdropping on (2) a “confidential communication” (3) to which all parties did 
not consent.  Flanagan, 41 P.3d at 577.  As set forth below, Plaintiffs have not established that the 
communications at issue are confidential pursuant to section 632.  Accordingly, the Court 
GRANTS without prejudice Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ section 632 claim.  Because 
this second element of a section 632 claim is not met, the Court need not address whether email 
constitutes an electronic recording under the statute nor need it address whether there was consent 
under California law.13   
A conversation is “confidential” under section 632 “if a party to that conversation has an 
objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded . . . . 
The standard of confidentiality is an objective one defined in terms of reasonableness.”  Faulkner 
v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013).  “To prevail against a 12(b)(6) 
motion, then, [the plaintiff] would have to allege facts that would lead to the plausible inference 
that his was a confidential communication — that is, a communication that he had an objectively 
reasonable expectation was not being recorded.”  Id. at 1020.   
There is no authority from the California courts addressing whether emails can be 
confidential communication.  Some decisions from the California appellate courts, however, 
suggest that internet-based communication cannot be confidential.  These courts rely on the theory 
that individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation that their online communications will not be 
recorded.  In People v. Nakai, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), for example, the 
California Court of Appeals found that section 632 did not protect instant message communications 
                                                          
13 The Court also need not address whether the ECPA preempts section 632 of CIPA, as Google 
contends.  See ECF No. 44 at 26–27. 
Case5:13-md-02430-LHK   Document69   Filed09/26/13   Page40 of 43
 
 
 
41 
Case No.:  13-MD-02430-LHK 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 D
is
tr
ic
t C
ou
rt
 
Fo
r t
he
 N
or
th
er
n 
D
is
tri
ct
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
of a criminal defendant charged with attempting to send harmful matter to a minor with intent to 
arouse and seduce.  There, the defendant, an adult man, had sent sexually explicit material via 
instant message to a 35-year-old decoy, who was posing as a 12-year-old girl.  Id. at 405–07.  The 
appellate court found that while the defendant intended that the communication be kept 
confidential between himself and the recipient, he could not reasonably expect that the 
communications would not be recorded.  Id. at 418.  Specifically, the court found that the fact that 
the intended recipient could easily forward the information to others militated against finding that 
there was a reasonable expectation that the instant message would be kept confidential.  Id.  As the 
court stated, “it was not reasonable for defendant to expect the communications to be confidential 
because the circumstances reflect that the communications could have easily been shared or viewed 
by . . . any computer user with whom [the intended recipient] wanted to share the communication.”  
Id.; see also People v. Cho, 2010 WL 4380113 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2010) (holding chat 
conversations are not confidential under section 632); People v. Griffitt, 2010 WL 5006815 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010) (“Everyone who uses a computer knows that the recipient of e-mails and 
participants in chat rooms can print the e-mails and chat logs and share them with whoever they 
please, forward them or otherwise send them to others.”).  
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that lead to the plausible inference that 
the communication was not being recorded because email by its very nature is more similar to 
internet chats.  Unlike phone conversations, email services are by their very nature recorded on the 
computer of at least the recipient, who may then easily transmit the communication to anyone else 
who has access to the internet or print the communications.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not plausibly 
alleged that they had an objectively reasonable expectation that their email communications were 
“confidential” under the terms of section 632.14  
                                                          
14 The Court’s holding that the emails are not “confidential” under section 632 is consistent with 
the conclusion that Plaintiffs have nevertheless not consented to Google’s interceptions under the 
Wiretap Act and state analogues.  See supra section III.A.2.  Determining whether a 
communication is confidential under section 632 requires the Court to look to whether the intended 
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Therefore, the Court GRANTS Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ section 632 claims.  
In a case concerning whether a communication was confidential under section 632, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to dismiss, but “[i]n an abundance 
— perhaps an overabundance — of caution” remanded “to the district court for it to consider 
allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint in a manner that would satisfy federal pleading 
standards.”   Faulkner, 706 F.3d at 1021.  Here too this Court in “an abundance of caution” grants 
Plaintiffs’ leave to amend their Consolidated Complaint.  Id.; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a).  
C. Other State Law Claims 
 Plaintiffs also allege that Google violated Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Florida law.  With 
respect to Maryland and Florida law, Google’s sole contention in its Motion to Dismiss is that 
these claims are derivative of Plaintiffs’ federal causes of action.  See ECF No. 44 at 5.  Google 
expressly acknowledges that the Maryland and Florida anti-wiretapping statutes mirror the ECPA.  
See id.  Therefore, Google’s Motion to Dismiss these claims is based on its Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ federal claims.  Because the Court denies Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal 
causes of action, the Court also DENIES Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Maryland and 
Florida claims.  
 Google offers an independent basis for dismissing part of Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania law 
cause of action.  Specifically, Google contends that Pennsylvania law protects only the sender of 
communication from wiretapping, not the recipient of that communication.  See ECF No. 44 at 13.  
As a result, Google moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania law claim brought by those who 
received emails from Gmail addresses.  Id. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
recipient of the communication is likely to share the communication.  In contrast, the question of 
consent turns on whether Plaintiffs have authorized the third-party interceptor’s interference in the 
communication.  In the instant matter, the Court concludes that emails are not likely to be kept 
confidential by the intended recipients under section 632.  Nevertheless, individuals do not consent 
to third parties’ interception of their emails.  
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 Google relies on Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 633 (E.D. Pa. 
2006), where the court held that “[a] claimant must demonstrate ‘that he engaged in [a] 
communication’.  The intended recipient of an intercepted communication, therefore, has no 
standing to raise claim [sic] under section 5725.”  See ECF No. 44 at 13.  Plaintiffs do not contest 
that Klump limits the scope of their Pennsylvania cause of action to those who sent emails to Gmail 
recipients and eliminates their cause of action against those who received emails from Gmail 
senders.  Rather, Plaintiffs contend only that this Court should not follow Klump because that case 
was wrongly decided.  See ECF No. 53 at 11.  However, Plaintiffs do not point to any authority 
from the state or federal courts in Pennsylvania that is contrary to the court’s holding in Klump.  In 
the absence of contrary authority, this Court will follow the decision in Klump.  Accordingly, the 
Court GRANTS Google’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the claims under Pennsylvania law 
raised by Plaintiffs who received emails from Gmail users.  In an abundance of caution, however, 
the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend the Consolidated Complaint.  
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Google’s Motion to Dismiss with 
leave to amend with respect to Plaintiffs’ CIPA section 632 claims and Plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania law 
claim as it relates those who received emails from Gmail users.  The Court DENIES Google’s 
Motion to Dismiss with respect to all other claims.  Plaintiffs shall file any amended complaint 
within 21 days of this order.  Plaintiffs may not add new causes of action or parties without a 
stipulation or order of the Court under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Failure to 
cure deficiencies will result in dismissal with prejudice.  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  September 26, 2013    _________________________________ 
 LUCY H. KOH 
 United States District Judge  
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